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Modern Europe
culmination of a policy which the National Government had followed continuously since Hitler's
coming to power. The author argues that the British never seriously doubted (as perhaps they
should have done) that Germany's ascendancy in
was inEurope
Eastern and Southeastern
compatible with their own survival as a European
great power; hence they never really contemplated
giving Hitler a "free hand" in the East, for that
would have overturned the existing balance of
power to their permanent disadvantage. Down to
1939 British policy concentrated instead on "resistance short of war" and took primarily economic
and financial forms, supplemented by occasional
talk of colonial concessions. This policy reflected
Chamberlain's belief in the paramount role which
the British economy would have to play in peace or
war and a general conviction that military combinations against Hitler, made in the name of deterrence, would only bring war closer.
After the German occupation of Prague, which
seemed to show that Hitler's appetite was insatiable, Halifax emerged as the chief formulator
of policy and finally committed the British to the
defense of Poland on the grounds that to do less
would open Germany's way to the peaceful conquest of Eastern Europe, thus nullifying the West's
economic leverage on the Continent and irreparably damaging its standing with the United
States. All this was done in an atmosphere heavily
freighted with feelings of humiliation, uncertainty,
and incipient panic; and it may, Newman concludes, have been done for invalid reasons, because
it is still not established whether Hitler meant to
compass the ruin of the British Empire.
On its salient points the book is consistently
persuasive and often convincing. Even so one may
wonder whether Newman has not made too much
of what he calls the "middle course" between
and a
unilateral concessions
("appeasement")
sturdy defensive coalition (the "Grand Alliance"),
for as he himself admits, the economic gambits on
which it was based frequently had an ad hoc and
very tentative quality. Similarly one may doubt
whether he has got the emphases exactly right
when he insists that the Cabinet knew for a certainty in Mlarch that its guarantee would have no
deterrent effect on Hitler and amounted, therefore,
to an anticipatory declaration of war. Several of
the book's themes and conclusions have been foreshadowed elsewhere, but the controlled orchestration of the whole makes this an independently
valuable contribution to the on-going appraisal of
British policy during the last period in which the
delibrations and decisions of Whitehall swayed the
destinies of entire continents.
DONALD LAMMERS
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In recent years a number of studies have appeared
which provide a much better understanding of the
tumultuous events in Southeast Europe during
World War II. Elisabeth Barker has made use of
recently opened British archival material to present a detailed though narrowly focused examination of Britain's policy in the Balkans as devised
and implemented by the Foreign Office and SOE.
While the work covers British policy toward all the
states from Hungary to Greece, the author devotes
much more space to countries other than Greece
and Yugoslavia.
Britain's interests in the area have traditionally
focused on the periphery in places such as Greece
and the Straits. During the interwar era Britain
tended to follow the lead of France in its relations
with the governments of the Balkan states. The
outbreak of war forced the British to attach greater
significance to the Balkans as a means of demonstrating their ability to carry on the struggle in
Europe at a time when they were practically shut
out of the continent by Hitler. Their efforts at
bolstering the resistance of the Southeast European governments to Nazi blandishments down to
1941, were, as the author clearly demonstrates,
inhibited by both a lack of resources and the fear of
provoking Hitler and thus achieved little success.
A clash with the Axis forces in this area was inevitable as Hitler shifted his strategy from a direct
attack on Britain to one of dealing her a blow in a
"peripheral" place like the eastern Mediterranean.
The author notes Churchill's desire to use the
Balkans militarily to attack the Nazis as well as his
concern to keep the Russians from acquiring a
predominant position in the area after the war
ended. She then illustrates in detail the divergence
in outlook between the various policy and action
branches of the government that made British activities in this area much less unified than many
have presumed them to have been. Barker also
mentions the differences of opinion between the
British and Americans over policy concerning the
Balkans but does not fully explore the problem.
As the war progressed and the balance tipped in
favor of the Allies, the British were faced with the
unwelcome though not unexpected fact that the
Soviet Union was now the dominant power in the
area. Whatever assurances the British had given to
the leaders of the Southeast European states were
negated by the fact that, except for Greece and to
some extent Yugoslovia, Britain's presence was
limited to propaganda, some military missions,
and a far from perfect intelligence network. Barker
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argues persuasively that the British, acting on the
basis of political realism, recognized the certainty
of Russian dominance in Romania, Bulgaria, and
Hungary by the summer of I 944, and accepted this
as an accomplished fact in return for retaining a
measure of influence in an area of real interest,
Greece.
The author's choice of a year-by-year and a
country-by-country
approach results in a large
number of chapters (twenty) and inescapable fragmentation and repetition in the narrative. A third
of the text is devoted to the period from 1939 to
1941 and the rest to the years 194i and 1944. An
annoying though small number of typographical
errors (half a sentence is missing on page 230) do
not significantly detract from the considerable
worth of the book.
GERASIMOS AUGUSTINOS
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This book is a collection of articles based on material delivered at a conference at the University of
London in I973. M,ost of the contributors were
participants in the events they describe. Elizabeth
Barker's excellent piece on the foreign policy of the
Foreign Office toward Yugoslavia concludes that,
in priority, the Foreign Office was more interested
in protecting the area from postwar Communism
than in defeating Germans. F. W. D. Deakin exposes "The Myth of an Allied Landing in the
Balkans

. . ." as an American

obsession,

in a piece

that supports the official histories of his British
colleagues, Michael Howard and John Ehrman.
Barker and I)eakin are professional historians in
the best sense but that is not true of Bickham
Sweet-Escott and S. W. Bailey, former SOE agents
who seem imbued with what Barker elsewhere
called a sort of T. E. Lawrence complex" (p. 30).
Bailey was parachuted to Mihailovic's headquarters as Senior British Liaison Officer. His article,
"British Policy Towards ... Mihailovic', " carefully documents NMihailovic's collaboration with
the Nazis, but his expressed purpose is to plead for
a greater sympathy for the behavior of the Chetniks.
Three articles on Greece by Brigadier E. C. W.
Myers, C. M. Woodhouse, and Richard Clogg are
more thematically integrated. The three authors
agree that the Foreign Office and Churchill were
responsible for the Greek catastrophe by their insistent support of the king's determination to re-

turn to Greece before a plebiscite on the monarchy. All three agree that the critical point of no
return was passed in September 1943 with the
politically disastrous visit to Cairo of six Resistance representatives from occupied Greece. When
the delegates insisted on discussing the composiAmbassation of the Greek government-in-exile,
dor Leeper curtly terminated their visit and ordered them to return. The Foreign Office
supported Leeper. The stunned delegates now became convinced that "British policy" was determined to restore the monarchy. This sad September moment fatally set events into motion toward
their sanguinary denouement: the British intervention and the bloody suppression of the resistance in the Battle for Athens in December I944.
But the three authors differ as to why the Foreign Office should have changed its policy. To
Myers, Communism was a false issue used by the
Foreign Office in order to disguise its primary
policy of restoring the monarchy. Woodhouse, on
the other hand, has been persistently a cold war
warrior. Nevertheless, he now concludes that the
Greek Communist Party (KKE) was divided in
counsel, unsure of its policy, and willing to seek an
accommodation with the British. It was the insensitivity or lack of knowledge of these conditions,
or both, on the part of the Foreign Office which led
to the tragedy of the December Days. In other
words Woodhouse has moved considerably in lessening the KKE's responsibility for the fighting in
Athens. Clogg argues that, had the British lessened their support of the king they would have
deprived the KKE of its strongest appeal which
was to the republican sentiment of "ninety percent " of the population. Thus at the root of
Clogg's argument one finds, again, the proverbial
fear of Communism as the deus ex machina. These
differences are most important because the premises behind them measure the inadequacy of Greek
resistance studies to date. What the three really
disagree about is how best to restore the state, and
they refuse to understand the Greek resistance as a
national and revolutionary movement.
This collection underscores the importance of
the new documentation in the Public Record Office but it does not offer any new historical insights. Barker (British Policy in South-East Europe),
Deakin (Embattled Mountain) and Woodhouse
have recently pub(Strugglefor (Greece,194I-I949)
lished books broader in scope.
HARRY CLIADAKIS
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